Weiterführende Literatur

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Kann der Stabilitätspakt reformiert werden?

Vorschläge für eine normative Revision regelgebundener Fiskalpolitik in der Europäischen Union

VON MARKUS C. KERBER
September 2004

The discussion on the implementation of the stability pact in Europe has laid bare the major institutional gap in fiscal policy within EMU. Governments are tied by the pact and judged by the voters. That has been triggering off the scientific search for a flexibilsation of the stability pact in national fiscal policy.The bargaining by France for keeping her national spending out of reach from the Commission as a principal and corner stone of national-sovereign policy cannot deny the intellectual legitimacy of the controversial findings by Giorgo La Malfa. He states the institutional mismatch between political responsibilty of governments towards the electorate and their lack of fiscal policy freedom. This Paper finds answers to La Malfa’s thesis without leaving the path of a rigid fiscal policy set out in the Maastricht Treaty.

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Ist der Stabilitätspakt noch zu retten ?

Anmerkungen zu den institutionellen Voraussetzungen regelgebundener Fiskalpolitik

VON MARKUS C. KERBER
November 2003

The discussion on the implementation of a national stability pact in Germany has laid bare the major institutional gap in German fiscal policy. That discussion has been triggering off the search for coordination and unity in German fiscal policy.The mutual bargaining of public entities like Länder, municipalities and the federal state as well as the systematic incongruity between responsibility on the one hand and fiscal policy management on the other have definitely turned out to be anachronistic. Within the legal constitutional framework there is no exit out of that dead end. In view of benchmarks for national fiscal and budgetary policy ordered by European law there is only one institutional criterion: Under which institutional conditions can Germany conform sustainably with the stability pact?
While normative inefficiencies of the stability pact cannot be cured as the recourse to “exceptions from the rule” is unavoidable, this “innate normative flexibility” can only be compensated by strong decisionary institutions. Such institutions necessarily have to dispose of the power of sanctions. Those sanctions however should be subject to post-judicial control.

>>> PDF-Version "Ist der Stabilitätspakt noch zu retten?"

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Die Umsetzung des europäischen Stabilitätspakts in Deutschland

Anmerkungen zur politischen Ökonomie von Gesamtstaatlichkeit

VON MARKUS C. KERBER
2002

>>> PDF-Version "Die Umsetzung des europäischen Stabilitätspakts in Deutschland"